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 “[Enlightenment] looks sad and emaciated, and, though laden with honours, 
bears the scars of many a lost battle. However, it is undaunted and has not lost its 
satirical grin. In fact, it has donned new clothes and continues to haunt the 
dreams of those who believe that the enigma of life is all encompassed within the 
design of a shadowy and mysterious god, rather than in the dramatic recognition 
of the human being’s freedom and responsibility.”—Vincenzo Ferrone1 
 
 
§ 
It is 1817, and with Kant’s revolution still unfolding apace on the continent, 
the English humourist Thomas Love Peacock includes in one of his satirical 
novels an irreverent episode taking aim at the new critical philosophy. Said 
episode concerns itself with one “Mr Mystic”, a philosopher in 
transcendentalist mould, for whom the secret “root” of Kantian enlightenment 
 
1 V. Ferrone, The Enlightenment: History of an Idea, trans. E. Tarantino, Princeton, PUP, 2015, pp.vii. 
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has been laid bare. 
Herr Mystic sees what others cannot: that this world-historical threshold 
does not usher in illumination or clarification, but teaches a form of self-
induced benightenment, or, the art of “wilful blindness”. 
Our philosopher, that is, lives on an islet (which he calls his “Island of  Pure 
Intelligence”) and he has arranged it “according to the topography of  the human 
mind”; and yet, this sprawling masterwork is entirely impossible to see, as the 
entire property and its surrounding moat (or, the “Ocean of  Deceitful Form” in 
Mystic’s argot) are bathed in impenetrable fog and stygian darkness. This, 
however, is entirely by design: for Mr Mystic defines “transcendentalizing”—
and philosophizing generically—as the “faculty of wilful blindness”. 
“None are so blind as those who will not see”, Mystic announces in zealous 
approbation.  In other words, Mr Mystic—being darkly enlightened—refuses all 
public, assessable, or appraisable forms of knowledge: “always keeping his eyes 
closed shut whenever the sun had the impertinence to shine upon them”. This 
comportment bequeaths to him alone the “pure anticipated cognition of the system 
of Kantian metaphysics [as that] grand transcendental science of the luminous 
obscure”. And, at the kernel of said “science”, gigantic “MYSTERY” supreme 
rules sovereign. Certainly, we learn that Mr Mystic—as a true 
“deisdæmoniacoparadoxographical, pseudolatreiological, transcendental 
meteorosophist”—holds it “very unbecoming in a transcendental philosopher 
to employ any other material for a purpose to which smoke is applicable”. 
Appropriately, he uses a “synthetical torch” to navigate his grounds, which, 
giving off nubilous rays of transcendental darkness, allows him to see through 
the “medium of ‘darkness visible’”. 
Mystic, accordingly, commends opinions exclusively insofar as they are 
“exquisitely dark and fuliginous”: in self-conscious rejection of the “common 
phraseology of bright thoughts and luminous ideas, which were equally abhorrent to 
him in theory and practice”. This stance, as the cultivated dismissal of any 
determinately accountable thought, provides Mr Mystic the profound insight that 
Kantian “Pure Intelligence” is rightfully considered a “tenebricose view” of “wilful 
blindness” onto the “adytum of the LUMINOUS OBSCURE”.2 
 
2 T.L. Peacock, Melincourt, vol.3, 3.vols., London, 1817, pp.25-40. 
 THOMAS MOYNIHAN 495 
§ 
Itself now ‘obscure’, we recall this long-forgotten satire of pseudo-Kantian 
tenebrification because Mr Mystic remains very much with us today. His 
overarching gambit (namely, that the abundances of supersensible night can 
deliver us from the impositions of public lights) has never gone away, it just 
assumes different vestures. Having once portended that “transcendentalizing” 
promises exemption from everything appraisable and determinable in 
knowledge, Mr Mystic’s present-day progeny now instead augur bootstrapping 
superintelligences as retrocausally nullifying, in advance, all inertial residuum 
of such anthropocentric impositions. As such, we raise Mystic’s spectre because 
the project here under review—Reza Negarestani’s Intelligence and Spirit—
represents the multifront attempt to exorcize ‘Mr Mystic’, and his present-day 
progeny, and their abuses of enlightenment, once and for all. 
For, though Intelligence and Spirit is, at heart, a summa on the interface 
between the philosophy of mind and the project of creating Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI), it is indissociably also a contestation for the historical 
Enlightenment’s legacy and, more importantly, its prospects. Namely, 
Negarestani proposes that that grand culmination of the Age of Enlightenment, 
German Idealism, represents an unfinished and unexhausted program for the 
future of intelligence, and not mere “Teutonic smoke” best forgotten.3  
§ 
Certainly, Mr Mystic’s pseudo-Kantian fogginess couldn’t be further from 
Kant’s own instructions. “[T]he power of imagination enjoys walking in the 
dark”, Kant warned, and thus risks “falling into ridiculous purism” if, by 
rejecting appraisability, specifiability and determinability, it hopes to exempt 
itself from earning the “distinctness” of “clarity”. Thereafter cautioning that 
“studied obscurity is often [employed] to feign profundity and thoroughness”, 
Kant alludes to the Greek rhetorical motto “Skotison!” (translated as “Make it 
Dark!”) and claims that this is the “decree of all mystics”. In strict contrast to 
such “affected obscurity”, Kant instead enjoins “[c]larity [in] the presentation 
 
3 R.B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, CUP, 1989, pp.5. 
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of concepts”. “This”, he avers, “is the brightness of mind!”4 
Yet the question of ‘enlightening’—that now mostly dead metaphor, yet 
hitherto invincibly indefatigable precept—was already utterly contested as soon 
as it had come to a head in Kant’s first Kritik. During 1784, in the self-same 
month that Kant asked the question ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ whilst defining it as an 
assumption of self-responsibility by analogy to the legally-significant graduation 
of a minor into adulthood, J.G. Hamann responded (in a fashion to become all-
too-familiar across the next two centuries) by attacking the notion of self-
authorship that is the very keystone of Kant’s definition. There can be no such 
thing, Hamann inveighed, for everything is just power relations between self-
styled “guardians” and “immature persons”. Ergo, Kant’s so-called Aufklärung is 
mere cozenage. “The enlightenment of our century is therefore a mere 
northern light”, Hamann concluded: its putative refulgence a mere “cold 
unfruitful moonlight”; its guiding light nothing but “blind illumination”.5 
§ 
What is at stake in Enlightenment may seem an antiquarian’s angst; but 
nothing could be further from the truth, inasmuch as enlightening is just the 
empowerment of intelligence and remains so; and thus we, living in the incipiency 
of intelligence’s largescale artificialization, are likely standing upon the 
threshold of an upsurge in potency like no other; and, as such, it is pressing, as 
never before, to put to rest whether such a global expansion of intellect, or 
unprecedented intellogenic explosion, is blinding or binding. 
§ 
From Hamann down to what Negarestani suitably refers to as today’s 
“benighted cult of posthumanism”, the suspicions surrounding enlightening 
concern the very meaningfulness of responsibility and, in particular, any sense 
to “self-incurred” statuses thereof.6 Self-authorship, simply, requires appeal to 
some motivating standard in excess of, and irreducible to, all actual 
deportments and facts-of-the-matter. It relies upon rules explaining behaviour, 
 
4 I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. R. Louden, Cambridge, CUP, 2006, pp.26. 
5 J.G. Hamann, ‘Letter to Christian Jacob Kraus’, in What is Enlightenment?, ed. J. Schmidt, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2004, pp.147. 
6 R. Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2018, pp.115 (hereafter I&S). 
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rather than behaviour exhausting rules.  
§ 
At the heart of the matter, are two perennial and persistent responses to 
Kant’s revelation of the legality of rational activities. One which inherits 
reason’s supersensible supererogations as alone enabling us to concretely 
become ever more responsible for our judgements, and the other which inherits 
the same precisely as absolving us of all such discriminative liability in judging 
and thinking. One casts intelligence as the power to be correct; the other recasts it 
as mere power. This disagreement and its backdrop are utterly central to 
Intelligence and Spirit (hereafter I&S) and, moreover, also to contemporaneous 
discussions on the prognostic implications of ‘superintelligence’.  
Inasmuch as Negarestani rightly identifies that the projects of AGI and of 
philosophizing mutually converge upon “investigation into [the] possibility of 
having mind” (I&S 4-6), everything rests here upon the meaning of ‘possibility’. 
Simply, is ‘possibility’ blinding or binding? Following the former, supersensibility 
foments the absolutions of abundant night, thusly leading to gothic portents 
surrounding the future of mind; following the latter, it bestows the shepherding 
duties of austere discernment, securing the principle that all intelligence, insofar 
as it is intelligent, involves “making something better” (I&S 399). Settling this 
question is, for obvious reasons, key to assessing the portents of any future AI of 
human-level aptitude or beyond.  
§ 
As already insinuated, this matter is more important than ever, now in the 
second century after German Idealism’s perturbations. Intelligence’s ongoing 
delegation to machines procedurally explodes any residual presumption of 
clear-cut distinction between ‘epistemological’ and ‘practical’ issues, and, thus, 
at the limit, also between ‘doxastic’ and ‘existential’ species of risk: for, now as 
never before, what we think matters, in the sense that policymaking cannot but take 
itself to now have stakes of potentially extinction-level import; and, given the 
further prospect of intelligent machines, it is clear, in particular, that what we 
think about thinking matters, and does so acutely. In other words, the question of 
what ‘intelligence’ is (and does) is no longer a question for the philosophers; and 
yet, in the spirit of I&S itself (I&S 405-7), we note that the philosophers have 
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had 2000 years head-start on the matter and, thus, we ought to listen to them. 
And so, we duly ask: does the automatization and outsourcing of mind—
which merges ‘thinking’ and ‘action’ to a degree previously unappreciable (cf. 
I&S 464-5)—represent the final wresting of intelligence from the remnants of 
anthropocentric delusions such as accountability, or, conversely, does it 
summon us to a vocation that demands from us more constancy than ever 
before? Does our age’s newly-rediscovered ‘primacy of the practical’ elicit 
Tenebrosity or Tenacity? 
§ 
Kant, writing at the beginning of modern faculty specialization and being 
sensitive to natural science’s tendency to progressively granularize cognitive 
labour, saw that the mere profusion of data was nothing without criteria of 
appraisal. This motivated his demand for critique.7 In our own moment, it is 
not knowledge’s faculties and disciplines, as in Kant’s time, but knowing itself 
that is being decomposed and reverse-engineered by the breeding of data. The 
demand, therefore, for a “synoptic vision” is greater than ever.8 One 
accordingly desires a ‘critique of artificial reason’. 
§ 
We compare Mystic’s dusky dicta with J.G. Fichte’s resonant—and, 
importantly, refulgent—rallying cry concerning rationality’s global project: 
[T]his is the loftiest thought of all: Once I assume this lofty task I will never have 
completed it. […] That which is called “death” cannot interrupt my work; for my 
work must be completed, and it can never be completed in any amount of time. 
Consequently, my existence has no temporal limits: I am eternal. When I 
assumed this great task I laid hold of eternity at the same time. I lift my head 
boldly to the threatening stony heights, to the roaring cataract, and to the 
crashing clouds in their fire-red sea. “I am eternal!” I shout to them, “I defy your 
power! Rain everything down upon me! You earth, and you, heaven, mingle all 
of your elements in wild tumult. Foam and roar, and in savage combat pulverize 
the last dust-mote of that body which I call my own. Along with its own 
 
7 It also alerted him to the need for a defence of the unique social role of philosophy, as distinct from natural 
science. 
8 W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality, London, 
Routledge, 1963, pp.3. 
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unyielding project, my will shall hover boldly and indifferently above the 
wreckage of the universe. For I have seized my vocation, and it is more 
permanent than you. It is ETERNAL, and I am ETERNAL like it!9  
Such jubilations sound alike to Negarestani’s own exhortations—equally 
audacious and defiant—for the “view from nowhere” to be received as a 
“necessary task” that reason cannot but undertake: a task that, qua atemporal and 
atopic, is “never given in what appears to us in time but [is] procured through 
the cunning plot of history to explore the meanings of time” (I&S 248). This 
ongoing ‘ruse of reason’ takes place because “[t]he totality of the Idea of mind 
cannot be represented temporally” (I&S 237). As such, in the face of the 
longest-term entropic prospects of physical eschatology, Negarestani proclaims 
that “[t]hought is not a servant of the life that death’s inevitability expropriates, 
so why should it exercise humility in the light of inescapable death?” (I&S 496). 
Such nigh-on-impossible ambition and boldness may prove rebarbative to 
some (namely, those still enthralled by what Wyndham Lewis, in the 1920s, had 
already diagnosed and denigrated as modernity’s Bergsonist “time-mind” and 
its “mystical time-cult”).10 Yet it is our goal to show, by the end of this 
exploration, how such sweeping declarations follow, ineluctably and 
necessarily, from Negarestani’s otherwise modest elucidations upon the fine-
structure of our everyday judgings and doings. 
Indeed, I&S, in its very structure, aims to retrace and reproduce such a 
sequence, or, to demonstrate why mundane judgements cannot but lead to such 
to such catchments. Alternately, in terms relevant for the shape of any future 
intelligence, I&S’s very narrative trajectory establishes why being or having a 
mind necessarily involves more than “mere survival” (I&S 475) and more than 
the drive to “amass as much reward as possible” (I&S 397). As we shall see, 
holus-bolus identifications of intelligence with these latter notions are symptoms 
of an assumption, prevalent across all philosophical spectra, that, in 
acknowledging no clean distinction between semantic modality and temporal 
possibility, tends to reduce meaningfulness to maximalization, and thereby 
leads, invariably and inevitably, to gothic portents apropos “Skynet” or 
 
9 J.G. Fichte, Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, trans. D. Breazeale, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988, 
pp.168-9. 
10 W. Lewis, Time and Western Man, London, Chatto & Windus, 1927. 
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“Paperclip Maximizer[s]” (I&S 104).11 Ignoring the rational distinction between 
time and modality leads—whether one is invested in post-humanist pessimism 
or effective altruism—to such soothsaying fears about ‘maximizers’.12 
§ 
Concerning the structure of I&S, the book follows the passage of our 
protagonist “Kanzi”—an imagined infantile AI—from ‘childhood’ to 
intellectual and agential ‘adulthood’. This reaches a climax when Kanzi 
acquires the ability to have an objective world in view: 
Perpetually uprooted from [its] supposed natural home, Kanzi is now an object 
of practical freedoms [and] time-general thoughts. It [thus] prefers to foray out 
into the open, to eat, beneath the stars, a marshmallow toasted over a 
Promethean fire that it has made for itself. […] For Kanzi, the automaton 
spirituale—the it—that thinks is now the I, or we, that thinks. (I&S 277) 
Here enlightenment, as the passage into cognitive maturity, is no meagre 
aurora borealis or cozening ignis fatuus, but, rather, is a jubilant “Promethean fire” 
that spirit has forged to guide its own way in its vocation of self-authorship 
under the open skies. 
§ 
In this fashion, I&S conspicuously re-enacts, in its very structure, Kant’s 
definition of “Aufklärung” as the graduation from nonage to maturity. The book, 
that is, comprises an expansive disquisition upon the feasible mode of creation, 
and education, for a burgeoning AGI. For, furthering an idea suggested first by 
Alan Turing (I&S 278n), I&S sets out an in-depth “curriculum”, or “generalized 
pedagogy”, for “raising [a] child-AGI” (I&S 277-93); and it attempts this 
precisely because, in Negarestani’s words, “the primary goal of education [is] 
the functional re-realization [of] what mind already is” (I&S 280). It is the 
revivification of the Humboldtian scheme of education by way of a program for 
the baptism of a future AGI. 
 
11 Cf. N. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford, OUP, 2014, pp.150-3. 
12 Note that Bostrom defines intelligence as “capacity for instrumental reasoning”; as we shall see, any 
such extensionalist outlook, will lead, inevitably, to maximizer fears. Cf. N. Bostrom, ‘The 
Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents’, Minds and 
Machines, vol.22, no.2, 2012, pp.71-85. 
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Consequently, the book, crucible-like, comprises an extended plausibilistic 
thought experiment.13 Modelled therein, our apprentice-AI proceeds stepwise 
from ‘nonage’ to ‘maturity’. It is an Aufklärung in miniature, if you will. For, 
after an introduction delineating the scope of the work, and following a second 
chapter establishing what it is positioning itself as palliating, the ensuing 
sections (save an important “excursion into time” within the third chapter) 
procedurally grant to our automaton the “causal-structural” (chapter 4) and 
thereafter “discursive” (chap.5 & chap.6) functional layers that, after its “ascent 
to the infantile”, eventually allow it to debut “full-blooded” sapience (I&S 140). 
Baptized “Kanzi” along the way (I&S 251-2), we see our model-agent ascend, 
with the addition of each working capacity and competency, towards 
apperception, to earn its life under the stars, cooking its Promethean 
marshmallow.14 
§ 
As such, the book recapitulates that quintessentially enlightenment-
romantic conceit of recapitulation. It is, through and through, a “Bildung”.15 
§ 
“Bildung” is an idea captured, masterfully, in the era-defining dictum “the 
 
13 This captures, at a structural level, Negarestani’s methodological interest in “abductive” or “model-
based reasoning”. (Cf. L. Magnani & T. Bertolotti eds., Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science, Dordrecht, 
Springer, 2017.) Talking throughout of “world-making”, “Lego model-building” and “toying around” 
(I&S 158 & 423), Negarestani’s focus on thought-experimenting is congenital with the key rationalist 
insight that cognition involves active construction more than passive reception: an insight contemporaneously 
inherited by neuroscience’s Predictive Processing paradigm (I&S 163-5). (Cf. L.R. Swanson, ‘The 
Predictive Processing Paradigm Has Roots in Kant’, in Frontiers Systems Neuroscience, vol.10, no.79, 2016.) 
Suitably, sustained reflection upon the practice of the “Gedankenexperiment”, or mental experimentation, 
was incepted by Kant himself. (Cf. Y. Fehige & M.T. Stuart, ‘On the Origins of the Philosophy of 
Thought Experiments: The Forerun’, in Perspectives on Science, vol.22, 2014, pp.179-220.) Sellars also 
employed the same tool, but he liked to refer to his models as “myths”.  
14 Negarestani’s Kanzi is named in honour of a real-world bonobo who has demonstrated aptitude 
learning artificial languages. Kanzi-the-bonobo famously signed for ‘stick’ and ‘marshmallow’ near a fire, 
before engineering a desert for himself. 
15 Note that Sellars’s Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind, which exerts significant influence on I&S, is also a 
Bildung: for, during the work’s climactic paragraph, Sellars notes that, in his “Myth of Jones”, one should 
have recognized “Man himself in the middle of his journey from the grunts and groans of the cave to the 
subtle and polydimensional discourse of the drawing room, the laboratory, and the study”. W. Sellars, 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Massachusetts, HUP, 1997, pp.117. 
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Child is the Father of the Man”.16 This adage does not express some 
bootstrapping time-travel paradox, but a program of self-authorship. Here, 
however, we will follow Negarestani’s rectification of Kant’s “this I or he or it, the 
thing which thinks” to an impersonified “this I, or we or it, the thing which thinks”, and 
similarly modify our idiom to “the CHILD is the Parent of  the Geist”.17 (“CHILD” 
being an acronym Negarestani lifts from Rosenberg: standing for “Concept-
Having Intelligence of Low Degree”, it is used to designate a debutant of 
apperceptive accountability, whether it be human infant or fledgling artificial 
agent).18  
Thusly updated, our adage articulates the core lesson of I&S: namely, that 
there can be unearned cognition and no arrogated intelligence. From this beating heart, 
emerge, by steady systole and diastole, all the lessons of the book: from its 
insights concerning our everyday sayings and doings to its lessons apropos AGI-
research as the very growing edge of modernity. 
§ 
“The CHILD is the Parent of  the Geist”. In this apothegm, expressing on its 
surface the deceptively trivial fact that no one is born an adult but must assume 
that status themselves, is compressed the deepest and most cardinal lesson of 
German Idealism and thereby also of I&S: namely, that there is no thought 
without earning it; no cognition without the work of having achieved it; and that, 
therefore, mind is at once its own artefact and artificer, or, “simultaneously a 
craftsman [and] the product of this ongoing craft” (I&S 483). For, as Hegel 
liked to point out, no one earns a cognition without first labouring for it, 
assaying it, working through it, tarrying with it. And, importantly, such ‘work’ 
simply cannot be captured by the fact-stating resources of language alone, 
inasmuch as it is about permissions—or what one can do—as much as it is 
about what one has actually done.  
Applicable both prospectively and retrospectively (I&S 491), there is no 
thought without having first got there. In Negarestani’s preferred phraseology this 
 
16 W. Wordsworth, ‘My Heart Leaps Up’, in The Major Works, Oxford, OUP, 2008, pp.246. 
17 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer & A.W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, A346/B404. 
18 J. Rosenberg, The Thinking Self, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1986, pp.135. 
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sentiment is expressed, throughout, as the “necessary link between intelligence 
and the intelligible” (I&S 477). This is the book’s core axiom. In short, 
declaring that there is no intelligence without intelligibility is of a piece with the 
notion that “the Child is the Parent of the Geist” inasmuch as both encrypt the 
insight that there is no intelligence without first having achieved it. Just as there is 
no move without a game and no utterance without a dialogue, there is no mind 
without the work of its self-realization—whether justificatory, pedagogical, or 
historical. Mind is an accomplishment. 
This is why reason, whether biotic or post-biotic, “is and will be always a 
task” (I&S 423). For to intone that “the Child is Parent of the Geist”—
inasmuch as such a statement unmistakably defines a program of self-
realization—is to recognize that intelligence has always been in the business of 
artificializing itself (I&S 445-51). Moreover, in its overtly recollective 
connotation, it implies that having a mind is never not the re-creation of  mindedness 
by way of retracing its conditions of possibility, or, its pathway to current 
concreteness (I&S 63-4). Mind, that is, is not some given factum but an ongoing 
faciendum. For, applied prospectively, we become ‘the child’: the child whose 
daring task it is to parent its own adulthood, or, cultivate that which “comes 
next” (I&S 95). This, then, is what Negarestani means when he says we are 
“the prehistory of intelligence” (I&S 411). 
But we get ahead of ourselves. The key to understanding this central dictum 
is to be crystal clear on the fact that both the recollective precedent and prospective 
achievement entailed by this process of self-authorship are not at all questions of 
ontology (despite the early Schelling’s innovative, but misguided, efforts to 
make it so by identifying ‘the transcendental’ with natural history). “A priest, a 
knight, a statesman, a citizen, are not”, writes Pippin, “natural kinds”.19 They 
are legal statuses; concerning prescription, not description; and are earnt, never 
given. 
No one is born an adult, let alone a statesman; likewise, no content-bearing 
cognition is unearned; for, simply, earning requires yearning. From this insight 
germinate German Idealism’s most distinctive insights: from Kant’s notion of 
 
19 R. Pippin, ‘Recognition & Reconciliation: Actualized Agency in Hegel’s Jena Phenomenology’, in Hegel: 
New Directions, ed. J. Deligiorgi, London, Routledge, 2006, pp.133. 
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the inescapable ‘togetherness’ of the quaestio facti and quaestio juris (or, no 
objectivity without the exertion of accountability); to Fichte’s conviction in the 
Primacy of the Practical (or, no science without the strife of summons); to 
Hegel’s discovery of sapience’s public and historical nature (or, no authority 
without precedential and recognitive labour). And, by simple manner of 
inheritance, so too do the master-ideas of Negarestani’s I&S proceed from this 
same root: respectively, that there is “no consciousness without self-
consciousness” (I&S 34); that mind “is only what it does” (I&S 1); and, finally, that 
it takes place within a “deprivatized space of language” (I&S 396) and, ergo, is 
a “project that takes time” (I&S 296). And all these conclusions, in turn, impinge 
upon the project’s myriad insinuations for concrete research and 
experimentation in computer science inasmuch as I&S positions itself as a 
‘prolegomena to any future AGI’: that is, from Negarestani’s championing of 
an “interactionist approach to computation” (I&S 353)—wherein syntax and 
semantics are afforded through “active-reactive” appraisal and jeopardization 
within games of mutual constraint (I&S 345)—all the way to his consequent 
indication that human-level intelligence will likely only be re-realized within a 
“multi-agent system” (I&S 249).  
Indeed, our dictum of self-parenthood also maps onto the deepest 
philosophical methodology of the book itself, inasmuch as, just as there is no 
maturity without reflection upon what one has thus far earnt for oneself and 
what exactly one has thusly entitled themselves to (I&S 503), so too, in the 
words of Wilfrid Sellars’s father, is it true that “only [the] realism that passes 
through idealism can hold its ground”.20 
§ 
As there is no future for intelligibility without retrospection on its 
legitimating precedents, alongside the ever-renewing critique thereof, so too is 
it the case that “[d]iscussing AGI in the context of German Idealism” is in no 
way “retrogressive” (I&S 128): for, in the idealist notion of Bildung was already 
packaged a program for the “re-realization and [critical] augmentation [of] 
mind” (I&S 280). Moreover, in elucidating that intelligence’s artificialization 
 
20 R.W. Sellars, ‘Consciousness and Conservation’, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology & Scientific Methods, 
vol.5, no.9, 1908, pp.238. 
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has been historically implicit all along (I&S 445-51), Negarestani is retrospectively 
revealing that today’s future-facing project of AGI-research is unfolding for 
enriching reasons, expressed thusly as a cumulative trajectory, rather than merely 
because of congruent causes, that can have no such direction. Only ideals, that is, 
can be imperfectly or implicitly realized: thus, to unveil anything as a process of 
‘making explicit’ demonstrates the time-bound footprint of normative goals, 
inexhaustibly articulated in finite time, rather than heteronomous causes 
extensionally exhausted. Negarestani’s retrospective convergence of the 
programs of German Idealism and AGI-research, therefore, operates as the 
ultimate legitimation and galvanization of the latter’s prospective task. This is why 
the question of incipient AI, in the here and now, cannot be the random quirk 
of some reasonless history but is, rather, the hortatory summons to an 
obligation. By placing the project of AGI within a retrospective arc of 
historically progressive self-artificialization, Negarestani thereby demonstrates 
that such “artificialization” is something that happens, and is happening, for a 
reason.21 And so, more than merely defending AGI from being “considered a 
pure vogue” victim to so-called ‘winters’ and hype cycles (I&S 454), such an 
account also recoups the project from those, on all sides, who refuse to see 
intellect’s artificialization as the non-optional continuation of the 
Enlightenment’s rational project (whether this refusal consists in construing 
artificial intellogenesis as either the derogations of retrocausal doom or as the 
random lotteries of Bostrom’s “urn of invention”).22 
§ 
To reject the arrogated in intellection by championing the “necessary link” 
between intelligence and intelligibility as “non-optional” (I&S 460) is to reignite 
the artificializing tenacities of Enlightenment. For nothing in thought is free: 
because earning anything takes effort, jeopardy, and time.23 Or, to borrow 
 
21 Negarestani is clearly reconstructing what Brandom calls a “expressively progressive” and “cumulative 
trajectory”. R. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Massachusetts, HUP, 2009, pp.112. 
22 N. Bostrom, ‘The Vulnerable World Hypothesis’, <https://nickbostrom.com/papers/ vulnerable.pdf>, 
2018 (retrieved 29/03/2019). 
23 This is the true sense of the ‘positionality’ invoked by Kant’s Copernican metaphor: it concerns 
‘position’ in the legal-vocational sense, not in the spatiotemporal sense; indeed, even traditional empiricists 
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Wittgenstein’s words, oft-repeated by Brandom, the “[l]ight dawns gradually 
over the whole”.24 Ergo, there can be no ‘blind’, ‘acephalic’, nor 
‘unaccountable’ general intellect. Intelligence, that is, attenuates in the dark 
rather than reconnecting with some primordial or preconscious power (whether 
this latter is conceived as intoxicating difference or telic techno-capital). As 
should be clear by now, the Desire for the Arrogated in Thought is just the 
Myth of the Given by another name. To acceded to either is to become Mr 
Mystic, or, to reject the light and approbate blindness and narcotizing 
darkness. 
§ 
And yet, from “Skynet” to “Roko’s basilisk” (I&S 104), Mr Mystic’s 
gothicism concerning “Pure Intelligence” has resurrected. Just as such 
Tenebrosity—one could also call it “Geistschmerz”, or, resentment for the 
burthens of intellect—first appeared in the aftermath of the eighteenth-
century’s earlier enlightening, we, currently standing upon yet another 
transformation in what it means to have a mind, are witnessing the 
recapitulation of conspecific contestations for enlightenment. Hamann and 
Mystic’s cognitive skotison re-emerges wearing new ‘post-humanist’ livery.25 As 
such, we return to the beginning in order to clarify what is at stake, now as 
then, in the contest between Tenacity and Tenebrosity in intellogenesis. 
§ 
To return to the beginning, Kant’s breakthrough consisted in 
demonstrating that there are certain locutions, utterly necessary for objective 
description, that nonetheless do not themselves in any sense objectively 
describe. Such expressions are functionally required for describing, yet are not 
at all targets of description, precisely because they instead govern and regulate 
how descriptive judgements should or ought to be used.  
Without this, no descriptive utterance could so much as even purport to be 
 
were concerned with the ‘limits’ of thought in this latter sense; Kant, distinctively, intends ‘position’ in the 
sense of being enrolled in an order of legitimations and permissions. 
24 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe & D. Paul, Oxford, Blackwell, 1969, §141. 
25 Explaining contemporary vogues for ‘dark’ philosophies: ‘dark vitalism’, ‘dark ecology’, ‘dark 
enlightenment’, ‘dark posthumanism’, etcetera. 
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describing an objective world, or, what’s the same, no utterance could even be wrong. 
Thus, not all language can be straightforwardly descriptive, because some 
language must deal with discriminating apposite and inapposite instances of 
describing. The point here is that what people mean by ‘should’ or ‘ought’ cannot 
be captured by pointing to facts alone, no matter how coreferential, because 
should-talk covers counter-to-fact instances as much as factual ones, and this is 
essential, and ineliminable, to its functional role in discourse.  
The otherwise obscure ‘purism’, ‘autonomy’, or ‘spontaneity’ of which 
Kant spoke—and to which Negarestani refers as sapience’s “formality” (I&S 
32)—rests simply and exclusively in this. 
So too, moreover, does the much-misunderstood ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’, to 
which we shortly return. 
With such ‘purism’, the Sage of Königsberg announced the idea that 
objectivity presupposes a framework that cannot itself be objectively described. 
Yet the ensuing transcendental-empirical bifurcation cannot be a substantive 
thesis, because only descriptive language can legitimately be said to be in the 
business of conveying substantive states-of-affairs. And this entails that the 
‘irreducibility’ of the transcendental over the empirical is, quite simply, a 
distinction within language and not a distinction within the world. Pointing to the 
split carries no ontological committal.  It is not a fact-stating thesis: the 
irreducibility involved being properly an issue of semantics, or locutory 
functions, rather than of what exists or declaratively is. It is, as Negarestani 
stresses, a “formal distinction” (I&S 59). 
In short, talking about the transcendental is not even describing anything, it 
is talking about talking. 
Yet not everyone has been clear on this. It is the mistaking of the 
transcendental-empiric split as being somehow descriptive in scope and range 
(even if such range is considered not to be capturable by the empirical sciences 
because it is construed as pure difference itself) that leads to the lineage of 
tenebrous post-Kantianism and its present-day heirs in anti-humanist augury. 
This, then, is the proton-pseudos of all those schools of thought that Negarestani 
purposes himself with rallying against.  But before we turn to this, we must 
clarify the locutory distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ language 
itself. 
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§ 
The so-called ‘is/ought’ gap, likewise, represents a distinction within 
discursive function and not within the world. The ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ was 
baptized by G.E. Moore, who first clearly noticed that the meaning of ‘Good’ 
could not be identified with any collection of facts, insofar as ‘propositions 
about the good’ are accomplishing something entirely different from picking 
out facts.26 They are how we appraise propositions ‘that p’ and are not 
themselves propositions ‘that p’.  
This is all that the non-naturalism of normativity rests in: it is not at all 
inflationary, nor the retention of theistic baggage, nor some human security 
system, nor smuggling with transcendent oughts. It cannot be reificatory because 
nothing concrete or objectival is declared. Ostension simply is not the normative’s 
locutory function. To presume that it must be is to commit J.L. Austin’s 
“Descriptivist Fallacy”, or, to presume that all meaningful language is 
indicative or otherwise can be captured indicatively or in declarative terms.27 
Indeed, it is unawareness of the importance of the functional distinction 
between realis and irrealis moods that invariably leads to ‘norm-phobia’. 
Thus, following Wittgenstein’s expressivist insights that “the ‘logical 
constants’ do not represent” and that therefore not all “language always 
functions in one way”, such a backdrop provides the basis for Negarestani’s 
frequent claims that the “distinction between thinking and being [is] formal (i.e. 
nonsubstantive)” (I&S 56), alongside his subsequent arguing for the “absolute 
formal autonomy of reason” (I&S 38), as well as his refusal of the “global 
reducibility” of “sapience” to “sentience” (I&S 151) and of “rule-governed” to 
“pattern-governed” activities (I&S 304).28 Negarestani is clear: 
One can and should always attempt to give an account of the conditions of 
thinking in terms of physical processes, in tandem with the empirical sciences. 
Yet it is a category mistake to claim that revealing how thinking is ultimately 
realized as a furniture in the world (if that is even possible or logically well-
founded at all) would enable us to say what thoughts in their formal rule-
governed dimension are. (I&S 439) 
 
26 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, CUP, 1993, pp.65. 
27 J.L. Austin, ‘Truth’, in Philosophical Papers, Oxford, OUP, 1979, pp.131. 
28 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Odgen, London, Routeledge, 1922, 4.0312. & 
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, New york, Macmillan, 1953, §304. 
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§ 
To clarify further, the issue regards the relative priority one takes ‘semantics’ 
or ‘ontology’ to possess in the order of explanation (cf. I&S 451). The 
interlocutor Negarestani identifies as the “greedy sceptic” (I&S 152) is 
whomever is moved to argue that all semantics takes place within ontology, and 
that thus the former is answerable, in the final instance, to the latter; the critical 
rationalist, by contradistinction, refines this outlook by acknowledging that it is 
nonetheless the case that all the activities we entitle ‘ontology’ (including all 
projects of naturalistic reductionism) necessarily proceed, insofar as they are 
even minimally legible, within and through semantic frames or models. By 
consequence, naturalization is just a privileged (indeed, uniquely privileged) type 
of semanticization or model-building.29 And, indeed, it is not something that 
anyone, or anything, does without motivating reasons or objective standards.  
(Put differently, though nature would no doubt exist without any sapient 
minds, ‘naturalization’ would not, and, what’s more, this former insight was 
never simply given, but was itself earned—starting from the roughly late Middle 
Ages—by centuries of hard-won elaboration and inquiry.) 
We note of this matter of ‘semantics’ or ‘ontology’, moreover, that it is, at 
the very least, an open question as to which methodological prioritization is 
correct; or, as Fichte long ago noted, such a decision betrays nothing other 
than one’s personal “inclination”.30 And so, despite the misleadingly ecumenical 
appearance of Fichte’s observation, the very fact that the question is specifically 
an open question betrays that it is, and will so remain, subject to the phenomenon 
called ‘disagreement’, which, notably, is an unavoidably judicial and discursive 
affair.31 
§ 
Two final points must be considered before we move on. First, the 
Naturalistic Fallacy is not merely a quixotic foible for metaethics. Rather, as 
Sellars firmly established, it saturates the whole infrastructure of cognition, 
 
29 L. Floridi, The Logic of Information: A Theory of Philosophy as Conceptual Design, Oxford, OUP, 2019, pp.67. 
30 J.G. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, trans. D. Breazeale, Idianapolis, Hackett, 1994, pp.18. 
31 Or, the possibility of so much as even being wrong presupposes such questions as are open and not 
closed in the sense of questions concerning facts are. 
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from perception upward.32 As Rorty asks, how could anyone think “that a 
causal account of how one comes to have a belief should be an indication of the 
justification one has for that belief?”33 That is to say, merely having a sensation is 
clearly not the same as being justified in believing it veracious. Presuming that 
non-epistemic facts on their own can grant us epistemic warrants to justify 
thinking anything as thus-and-so is, whether one likes it or not, to uncritically 
mingle the ways we think about the world with the world itself.34 This, indeed, is 
why “only [the] realism that passes through idealism can hold its ground”, or, 
why those who outright reject the Naturalistic Fallacy as idealistic nonsense—as 
opposed to accepting it as a necessary technical scruple—peddle only an 
“illusory disillusionment” (I&S 232) that is concordantly “blind to its own 
epistemological and methodological bases” (I&S 111). For it is only through the 
assiduity, the “ongoing cognitive labour” (I&S 474), of keeping norms and facts 
formally distinct that we regulate the difference between methodological and 
substantive issues—or, between how our words should be arranged to declare 
anything at all and the targets of declarative sentences themselves—and thereby 
track distinctions between our tools of description and the objects thusly 
described, or, between our representings and their representeds. Therefore, in 
rejecting such scrupulousness, “those who push for a brute disenchantment—a 
supposed all-destroying demystification of Forms or Ideas—will be condemned 
to face a fully enchanted and mystified world” (I&S 38). 
Certainly, in long-durational intellectual historical terms, it has only been 
through elaboration of these ineliminably artefactual (yet methodological 
indispensable) aspects of our cognitive frame that we have, across the centuries, 
come to progressively grasp the natural world independently of said frame and, 
thus, were summoned to the projects of naturalization, objectivity, and 
artificialization in the first place. Applying the same insight prospectively (i.e. to 
the future of such projects), grants us the clear warning that it is “those who 
discard what nontrivially distinguishes the human that [will] end up preserving 
 
32 “[T]hat epistemic facts can be analysed without remainder [into] non-epistemic facts [is] a radical 
mistake—a mistake of a piece with the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics.” W. Sellars, Empiricism and 
the Philosophy of Mind, Massachusetts, HUP, 1997, pp.19. 
33 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, PUP, 1979, p.141. 
34 J. McDowell, Mind and World, Massachusetts, HUP, 1994, pp.7. 
 THOMAS MOYNIHAN 511 
the trivial characteristics of the human in [an impoverished] conception of 
general intelligence” (I&S 116). Only by de-naturalising certain aspects of 
mind—classifying them, not as supernatural, or transcendent, but as 
transcendental—do we consequently naturalize it and, by thereby enhancing 
our image of ourselves in the world, ramify what our posterity may accomplish 
within it (I&S 442). 
§ 
Accordingly, Kant’s norm-infused transcendentalism is not a thesis about 
‘what is’, thereby trucking with the “improbable metaphysical hypothesis” of 
some “transcendent ‘ought’”, but is a thesis about mutually incommensurable 
yet equally indispensable expressive functions.35 To attempt to ‘describe’ an 
‘ought’, and do so only in descriptive terms, would be like trying to conjugate a 
noun. It is, simply, to mix up distinct grammatical modes; one could compare it 
to attempting to weld with a hammer. 
§ 
And yet, intentionally or not, many of Kant’s immediate heirs interpreted 
this newfound irreducibility of the transcendental over the empirical as being 
just another type of substantive thesis—even if it is one that is uniquely special, 
scientifically inscrutable, or mystically profound. This error, as it descends into 
our own moment, is often conducted under the banner of that species of 
enthusiasm that calls itself ‘immanence’. 
§ 
Refusing the normativity of the transcendental ineluctably leads, as 
Dionysis Christias lucidly puts it, to construing the transcendental, quasi-
descriptively, as some “surplus ontological” layer of reality: an echelon 
somehow in excess of, and irreconcilable with, the objectival layer.36 A kind of 
supra-mundane, pre-objective and pre-subjective arbitrariness or power: 
 
35 N. Land, ‘Crypto-Current (018)’, <https://www.ufblog.net/2018/12/01/>, 2018 (retrieved 
29/03/2019). 
36 D. Christias, ‘Toward the Thing-in-Itself: Sellars’ and Meillassoux’s Divergent Conception of Kantian 
Transcendentalism’, in The Legacy of Kant in Sellars and Meillassoux, ed. F. Gironi, London, Routledge, 2018, 
pp.135-62. 
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whether presented as genetic productivity, ontological incompleteness, 
hyperchaos, will-to-power, existence-before-essence, abyssal freedom, pure 
difference, or runaway autocatalysis. And so, the critical surfeit of rules over 
facts, or, the semantic autonomy of subjunctive oughts over fact-stating 
declaratives—which, for Kant, alone conferred objectivity to our judgings by 
vouching our ability to so much as even be guided toward better judgements 
via discriminating and repelling concrete errors—here instead degenerates into 
a quasi-ontological surplus that, precisely because of its indiscriminate 
profligacy, is lauded as absolving cognition, once and for all, of the labours of 
discriminating selection in judgement. As we shall see, this (despite any 
protestation or branding to the contrary) is a form of radical circumspection 
(or, rejection of the risks inherent in holding others accountable and being held 
accountable in turn) and is therefore, then as it is now, the prime symptom of 
Geistschmerz (as resentment for the burthens of rationality). Indeed, it motivates 
all present-day accounts that, by way of construing apperception as just another 
“force of nature” (I&S 453), claim that ongoing intellogenesis is yet one more 
teleonomy in nature’s self-reinforcing “complexification” (I&S 460) and, 
accordingly, imply that superintelligence will have been a question of hydraulic fate 
rather than hard work. 
All such manoeuvres are attempts to bypass the labours of clarification and 
coherence and constraint. Indeed, for the Tenebrous philosopher, thought 
becomes most adequate to reality precisely when it is divesting itself of such 
puny and moralistic fetters as explanatory or semantic constraints and is itself 
indulging in either muscular maximalism or unconscious submersion. (Hence, 
the restrictively romantic conceptions of aesthetics prevalent throughout the 
continental tradition, alongside its  cognate suspicion for the rigorizations of 
science.) Retaining the transcendental, yet stripping it of its normativity, one 
cannot but arrive at some variation upon this stance: the transcendental, no 
longer a guiding light, becomes the art of sinking oneself in “wilful blindness”.37 
Inevitably, therefore, transcendentalism—misconstrued in this sense as 
plentiful deliverance from proper thought by way of supra-empirical blindness 
and narcotizing profuseness—became identified, in the decades following 
 
37 A. Pope, Peri Bathous; Or the Art of Sinking in Poetry, London, 17208. 
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Kant, with what the Germans contemporaneously called the “Nachtseit der 
Natur”, or, “Nature’s Nightside”.38 Such tenebrous and narcotic 
transcendentalism was, back in the age of German Idealism, given voice by 
depth psychology’s Unbewusste, Schelling’s Ungrund, Schopenhauer’s Wille, and 
everything Ursprüngliche or primordial. Despite different vesture, the notion 
descends, in unbroken lineage, to us today: not only is it exampled by 
proponents of “preindividual singularities [and] ceaseless becoming[s]” in 
continental metaphysics (I&S 237), but also in those post-humanist schools of 
thought that proclaim that the sheer maximalities of computation or big data 
could somehow, in their ongoing proliferation, bypass the problematics of 
criteria conferral, normative orientation, and intentional discernment, and, 
through this route, ‘brute force’ the riddle of general intelligence.39 Today, as two 
centuries ago, such a route—of blind profusion via cognitive skotison—is “the 
night in which all cows are black”: an attempt to reach absolute intelligence, 
“like a shot from a pistol”, without any of the hard work.40 
As Negarestani avers, it is against such “paralyzing mist” that “the task of 
intelligence ought to be safeguarded” (I&S 492); for only through the assiduities 
of clarification is “the ineffability of general intelligence [to be] overcome” (I&S 
86). This is, and inexhaustibly remains, the Enlightenment’s tenacious task. 
§ 
Tenacity demands the conjoint jeopardizations and rigorizations of publicly 
appraisable knowledge, and therefore the constraints that enable dialogue as 
that mutual harnessing of agents towards better, more complete, and more 
discriminating adjudication. Tenebrosity, contrarily, prefers the 
circumspections and deliverances of “darkness visible”, believing that pointing 
to supra-semantic and supra-empirical superlativities absolves one of the 
 
38 G.H. Schubert, Ansichten von der Nachseite der Naturwissenschaft, Dresden, 1808. 
39 I borrow the terminology of ‘brute-forcing intelligence’ from Peter Wolfendale. Negarestani argues that 
“posthumanism built on the assumptions of inductivism and empiricism—i.e., superintelligence can be 
construed in terms of induction over Big Data—treat inductive models of general intelligence as evidence 
against an exceptionalism of the conceptualizing human mind [and yet] refuse to see the latter as a sui 
generis criterion that sets apart general intelligence as a qualitative dimension from quantitative intelligent 
problem-solving behaviours” (I&S 511-2). 
40 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford, OUP, 1977, §16 & §27. 
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summons, and thereby also the impositions, of such clarifying assessment. 
§ 
The split boils down to a semantic issue concerning “possibility”. For, if 
intelligence is that which explores “the ramifications of its [own] possibility” 
(I&S 448), then all “inquiry into the future of intelligence” (I&S 5) rests on the 
question: does “possibility” delegate or derogate responsibility? 
§ 
First off, note that there are sentences that are extensional and those that 
are intensional (with an ‘s’, not a ‘t’). The truth conditions and meanings of 
extensional sentences rely solely on local contexts, or facts at our actual world, 
whereas intensional sentences rely also on non-local contexts, or what is 
happening in other merely ‘possible worlds’.41 
Intensions, being referentially opaque, involve sense over reference: 
defining a term by invoking its conditions of apposite use, or space of possible 
applicability, rather than by enumerating all its actual instantiations (as an 
extensional definition does).  
Modal verbs, including deontic modals such as ‘should’ or ‘must’, always 
involve intensional contexts because their meaning is made legible only through 
reference to possible worlds (i.e. what is intended by the statement ‘Kanzi 
ought not use vocabulary incorrectly’ is clearly not reliant for its meaning 
exclusively on what Kanzi—fallible Kanzi—does in our actual world). Rules, 
likewise, are indelibly intensional in that their meaning involves what is going 
on in ‘other worlds’ as much as in ours: one hasn’t understood P↬Q as a rule if 
one doesn’t additionally grasp that P↬Q holds over counterfactual instances as 
much as actual ones. Rules, in other words, are ‘subjunctively robust’, with this 
being a defining feature of our nomological statements apropos natural law as 
much of those concerning the rules of logic, inference, and language (cf. I&S 
253-5).42 Intensionality, therefore, marks out the sentential capacity for 
meaningful reference to mere possibles—regardless of what actually happens or 
 
41 ‘Possible worlds’ are here considered not as objects of reference, but as artefacts of sense, or, ways of 
talking about talking. 
42 D.M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge, CUP, 1983, 43. 
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is temporally realized—and by meaningful we, importantly, also mean motivating 
(cf. I&S 401). 
Intensional modalities, simply, are requisite in order to retain minimal 
practicable intelligibility for an overriding amount of the everyday operations 
essential to our rational activity (from rule-following, to accountability, to 
justification, to the “self-incurred” statuses thereof). Take the example of rules. 
Understanding rule-following is indispensable to any explanation of how our 
linguistic utterances can even begin to carry or confer meaning. (Whosoever 
disagrees with this is invited to detail their case whilst not obeying any of their 
language’s rules.) For, crucially, no mere extension or set of facts, no matter how 
copious or coreferential, can capture or explain this essential dimension of 
meaning—i.e. our manifest tendency to repel misjudgements and thusly 
generate “objectivity” as that “tending to be true” central to the “essential drifts 
of consciousness” (I&S 266 & 277)—because no such extension can underwrite 
a distinction between how factual assertions should be and how they actually in 
fact are. Without this, one loses the ability to even be incorrect and loses 
objectivity, and any objective world, as collateral along with it.  
Intensions allow us to say we are acting for reasons whose semantic 
legitimacy, and thus motivating force and authority in the shepherding of 
judgements, arises entirely independently of the frequency or infrequency—the 
maximality or minimality—of their temporal realizations. And for rule-
following to be intelligible, in the sense of making intelligible our evident 
tendency to rectify errings and errors, the content of the rule and the modalities 
that codify it must be meaningful and motivating utterly regardless of the 
perfection, or imperfection, of their instantiation within matters-of-fact. This 
manifest quality of our everyday operations simply cannot be captured 
extensionally.  
So, it is merely possible worlds that alone grant our language the power to be 
actually correct; or, all extensional fact-stating requires and presupposes implicit 
grasp of inexhaustibly intensional possibilities. (Hence, why Negarestani notes 
that it is necessary that, in any autonomous language, there be “concepts that 
do not simply describe, but also [those that] allow cognitive simulation via 
counterfactuals” (I&S 67); with this being precisely why he places “modal 
vocabulary” at the very base of his hierarchical “curriculum for the education 
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of the CHILD” (I&S 282-4).) Accordingly, talk of possibility here is talk of that 
which endows our capacity to choose the right thing and consequently also to be 
assessed against this capability, or, it is the power to be constrained and regimented by 
“inexhaustible” values (I&S 401). In short, ‘possibility’ is, in this sense, what 
Kant intended when he spoke of our ability to act in accordance with an 
ideal—be it “Truth”, “Beauty”, or “Justice” (I&S 246). 
In this Kantian guise, ‘possibility’ buttresses the ability to select the right, 
because, rather than referring exclusively to powers of concrete things to 
potentially produce concrete effects at specific times, ‘possibility’ instead here 
carves up an intensional space of logical and semantic consistency—of 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between terms—that, rather than 
describing the contingent happenstances of things, provides the very framework 
within which all such happenstantial designation can alone procure objective 
purport (cf. I&S 258-60). We can only talk of indiscriminate possibility by virtue 
of the fact that all possible talk is discriminating; or, the possibility to select the 
correct in our talking precedes all talk of possibility as unselective power.43 Such 
a notion of possibility is necessary to allow intelligence to be what Negarestani 
dubs a “dimension of structuration” (I&S 276), or, to wield a language that can 
even purport to have an objective world in view (I&S 325): for, as Sellars 
pointed out, it is by virtue of the fact that our concepts fit together across 
subjunctive ranges that they can even describe a factual world in the sense of 
providing descriptions that can serve, open-endedly, as explanations for others 
and themselves stand in need of explanation (I&S 255n). 
Henceforth, we use possibility1 to designate ‘possibility as intensional 
consistency’ and possibility2 to designate ‘possibility as mere capacity to be’. It is 
 
43 This is cognate with Negarestani’s argument (elaborated throughout Chap.6) that it is the 
“interrelational order of symbols” that allows “the relations between different patterns or world-
picturings” to be “encoded” (I&S 303) and not the reverse. In other words, it is syntactic symbol-to-symbol 
relations (which “map to one another rather than to an item or occurrence in the environment/world”) 
that facilitate the semantic symbol-to-world or ‘aboutness’ relation. “Pattern-governed regularities in the 
real order are caught up in the relations between symbols, not the other way around” (I&S 304), which, in 
turn, is why “[t]he worldbuilding of the formal dimension of language and logic is prior—not just in the 
order of precedence but also of constitution to world-representation” (I&S 267). This, then, is why agents 
“increasingly structure their interactions with their environment [only by increasingly] structuring their 
own interactions” (I&S 321). For having an objective world, as Hegel clearly saw, is an accomplishment of 
public structuration. Or, constancy to the world is earned by virtue of our accountability to one another. 
 THOMAS MOYNIHAN 517 
only the former that allows us to be tenacious in our judgements, or, to be 
motivated by standards (e.g. ‘objectivity’ or ‘coherence’) whose presently 
imperfect realization is no inditement on their power to compel and guide as 
we go forward.  
Yet it is precisely this aspect of modality (i.e. its non-descriptive 
functionality, or, possibility1) that is foreclosed as soon as one construes the 
transcendental-empiric bifurcation as just another fact-stating thesis (again, no 
matter how non-standard or ineffable or infinitely creative such a factum is 
advertised as being). This is because intensionality consists precisely in 
‘referential opacity’ and ‘topic neutrality’, or, the insight that terms can be 
semantically legitimate—and, indeed, discursively indispensable—
independently of descriptive instancing and temporal frequency. Rid of non-
describing intensionality thereby, ‘the transcendental’ can longer orient but 
only disorients, or, rather than being binding it can only be blinding: because, 
to the exact extent that possibility1 is demoted into mere possibility of 
realization, the power to select the right becomes indistinguishable from mere 
brute power; and, by direct consequence of this, discerning reason sinks into 
blinding voluptuousity and darkness’s delectations. 
§ 
Simply, devolving possibility1 into possibility2 removes any robust semantic 
distinction between how judgements in fact are and how they should be. 
Consequently, we are left with two viable options. We can either subordinate 
nature maximally to jurisprudence, or, we can submerge jurisprudence 
maximally within nature. The former was, of course, the path chosen from the 
Ancients, down into the Scholastics, and well into the pre-critical 
Enlightenment of Leibniz or Wolff; the latter is the pathway invariably taken 
today by those hard-nosed anti-humanists, whimsical post-modernists, and 
masters of suspicion who react to any post-Enlightenment retention of human 
autonomy and dignity with “greedy skepticism” and, more recently, with 
“musings on Skynet [and] the Market as speculative posthuman intelligence” 
(I&S 111). So, if we reject Tenacity, our options are either Theodicy or 
Tenebrosity. 
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§ 
Theodicy is crystallized in Leibniz’s mantra that ‘whatever is, is just’. 
Tenebrosity is captured by the post-Nietzschean proclamation that ‘whatever is 
just is just whatever is’. Or, to give them both their full modal inflection, either: 
1) ‘Whatever is, is maximally just.’  
or 
2) ‘Whatever is just is just whatever maximally is.’ 
Despite desperately advertising himself as having transcended Theodicy’s 
philosophical ancien régime, the Tenebrous Philosopher’s fundamental gambit 
remains merely the reoccupation of the Theodical psychodrama. It is 
Theodicy’s inversion; not its supersession. For, despite embodying inverse 
‘directions of fit’, both identically manifest the same age-old presumption 
regarding modalities: they are, alike, ‘conjugations’ of the Principle of 
Plenitude.  
Both, that is, identically collapse modality wholesale into temporality, and 
thus prohibit any ultimate distinction between prescription and description, or 
between language’s declarative and regulative resources, such that both are 
doomed to mix human axiology with independent reality. For where one 
decrees reality interminably jurisprudent the other pontificates on its 
overflowing imprudence, yet, whilst reifying impious disvalue may seem more 
‘grown-up’ than the reification of judicial value, both routes are equally naïve 
because they both, ultimately, are attempts to absolve us of culpability for our 
assertions vis-à-vis objective affairs and are therefore as risk-averse as they are 
retrograde in their conspecific refusals of  accountability. This is precisely what 
Negarestani means when he notes that the anti-humanist interlocutor peddles 
only an “illusory disillusionment” (I&S 232). A cradle—whether consisting in 
tragedy, traumata, or the abundances and absolutions of narcotizing night—
remains a cradle nonetheless.  
§ 
In its classical guise, the Principle of Plenitude stated that ‘no legitimate 
possibility remains unrealized’: a thesis which operated, for centuries, to ensure 
that ‘reality is as legitimate as it possibly can be’. Put differently, there can be 
no unjustifiable absences in existence, or, no things that could have been, but 
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simply just never are, without any further justification. Following this, to be is to 
be justified—maximally and magnanimously so—such that, in the ultimate theodical 
gesture, ‘no fact is not valuable’.  
Often thought long-dead, a relic of grand old metaphysics, the Principle of 
Plenitude nonetheless survives today: it has silently transmuted, however, into 
an epistemological posture (or, as many of its practitioners would no doubt 
prefer, an ‘anti-epistemological’ one). For, in the Tenebrous philosopher’s 
hands, the schema is simply everted. ‘All values’, they insist, ‘are just virulent 
facts’, because, for them, ‘legitimation is nothing other than the realization of 
possibilities’, and, inasmuch as this measures legitimacy solely by realization, 
this latter claim collaterally entails that ‘the realization of no possible can be 
illegitimate’, or, all realizations are equal. Ergo, to be justified is simply to be, and 
to do so maximally and muscularly. 
§ 
Thus, two directions of fit: bequeathing either Theodicy’s judicial pleroma 
or Tenebrosity’s ajudicial abundances. A prudent plenitude or a pollent 
plenitude—occasioned, respectively, by the naïve absolutism of norms native to 
the Weltanschauung of the Ancients and, later, by the dejected phobia of norms—
or Geistschmerz—characteristic of us Moderns. Both, however, are identical in 
reducing possibility1 to possibility2.44 
§ 
This persistent presumption, which we name the Framework of Plenitude, 
infects pre-Kantian optimism as much as post-Kantian pessimism, and, in all its 
guises, is of a piece with the Myth of the Given, the Desire for Arrogated 
Thought, and, more so, the Naturalistic Fallacy. For where once this 
assumption worked to cradle thought in an infinitely judicial universe and insure it 
 
44 Note that pollent plentiude does not, like its prudent cousin, require that ‘all legitimate possibilities are, 
at some point, be realized’. Instead, it requires only that ‘all legitimacies are the realization of possibilities’. 
Many adherents of the thesis happily refer to eternally unrealized possibilities, but they would still 
measure their legitimacy solely and exclusively by their potency or potentiality to have become at some time 
actual, even if this is forever frustrated. “[A]n eternal object can be described only in terms of its 
potentiality for ‘ingression’ into the becoming of actual entities”, wrote Whitehead. A.N. Whitehead, 
Process and Reality, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2010, pp.23. 
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thereby against all true jeopardies, it now serves to underwrite the post-
humanist conceit that with a sheer proliferation of mindless facts one can 
circumvent—or ‘route around’—the imposition of ever requiring an 
discriminative ought or shepherding norm, and, thus, in the ongoing 
artificialization of sapience, skip the hard-work of legislative jeopardization and 
appraisal. Or, by analogy, intellect can be born an adult without undertaking any of  the 
risks of  responsibility. Yet this exemption is bought at the price of reifying 
unavoidably axiological intuitions such as impiety, injustice and imprudence 
(cf. I&S 453): all whilst parading as perfectly hard-headed disillusionment. 
Nonetheless, once more, a cradle of irresponsibility remains a cradle 
nonetheless. One reifies value, the other reifies disvalue, and by both doing so 
maximally, they both equilibrate mind and world—in whichever direction of 
fit—by stripping judgement of all motivating or meaningful stakes. 
§ 
Presuming nature interminably just, Theodicy removes stakes from our 
judgements, both practical and theoretical, because all error can only be local 
erring from the cosmos’s interminably judicial baseline. Though perfectly 
inverted, the Tenebrous philosopher accomplishes the same deliverance. For, 
in holding that legitimation consists solely in existing as much—or as 
multifariously—as is possible, the Tenebrous Philosopher consequently teaches 
that, ultimately, there can’t be ‘better’ or ‘worse’ judgements, only more. And 
this basic presumption of Tenebrosity operates the same regardless of whether 
one dresses one’s philosophy within the aesthetic of overflowing darkness or of 
blinding vibrancy: for both can equally be classified as “darkness visible”. Thus, 
techno-singularitarian pessimism and mystical-vitalist optimism are identically 
heirs to Mr Mystic (cf. I&S 111). Whether in bated anticipation of the 
fragmentations attendant upon incoming ‘human speciation events’ or in 
celebration of life’s exuberant and tentacular creativity after human terminus, 
all that Tenebrosity can do is blindly cry for more. 
Plenitudinarianism, therefore, represents the attempt to strip intentionality 
of all normativity, and thus stakes, via reliance on the absolutions of profligacy. 
Where once it motivated pre-Kantian optimism, it has since motivated much of 
continental philosophy’s post-Kantian career: from Naturphilosophie’s veneration 
of nature’s blind productivity and careless generativity, to depth psychology’s 
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promotion of unconscious inspiration as irresponsible creativity, to the 
celebration of duration and feeling as indivisible profusion, to the lionization of 
excess and libertinage from Sade to Bataille, to the turns to performativity as 
proliferation of identities, to the poststructuralist preoccupation with 
reticulating rhizomes and the destabilizations of différance, to the instinctual 
anticipations of some ‘Event’ or ‘X-to-come’ (as the invitation of novelty sans 
selectivity), all the way to today’s obsession with anti-anthropocentrism 
construed as the self-legitimating enfranchisement of more voices (whether 
animal, vegetable, or mineral), alongside contemporary interest in ‘patchwork 
experimentation’ in politics (where, as ever, mindless ‘proliferation’ exempts us 
from mindful ‘prescription’). The same attitude even undergirds the 
genealogist’s conviction that their project (i.e. of unmasking shepherding 
reasons as a copiousness of causes) is an “egalitarian exposition” (I&S 75-6). It 
also clearly undergirds assumptions “that political struggle can materialize […] 
simply by virtue of the multiplicity of experiences and desires” (I&S 474), 
alongside cognate convictions that we must resign to “microlocalist models [of] 
action” and wallow in the unceasing botanizing of lived experience’s 
irreducible ipseities (I&S 461). One can trace plenitude’s effect, moreover, in 
the premium on polysemy and punning, alongside deferral and displacement, 
over specificity and clarity, in matters of style. Concepts like ‘anthropocene’ 
can’t be left alone without being propagated into ‘cthulhucenes’, 
‘capitalocenes’, and so on. Plenitudinarianism is expressed even at the level of 
the academic article title, in habitual pluralizations: we deal, always, with 
‘pedagogies’ or ‘temporalities’, never with ‘pedagogy’ or ‘temporality’. At every 
turn, there is extravagance rather than governance; or, the “cognitive 
turpitude” (I&S 492) of “difference for the sake of difference” (I&S 245); for 
overflowing difference licenses a blank cheque for irresponsible thoughts; and 
yet, the radical democracy of thought is, in fact, nought but a kakocracy. 
If possibility is simply the power to be, rather than be correct, there is no 
discrimination—no ability to select between sound and unsound inferences—
such that Leibniz’s prudent plenitude everts into post-Sadean continental 
philosophy’s ethics of pollent profligacy. And without adjudication we can only 
cry out, in the mantra of Deleuze & Guattari, for “More perversion!” (though this 
is a semantic decadence, or comportment in theorization, rather than in the 
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boudoir).45 It is simply in being realized, and potently persisting, that a concept 
justifies itself (representative of Nietzsche’s ‘will-to-power’ as much as of 
hyperstition’s ‘meme magic’). Rather than being accountable to any objective 
standard, intentionality is recast as an act of irresponsible “concept creation”, 
an indiscriminate pollinator of possibilia2, whereby the transcendental’s 
irreducibility is transformed into a quasi-ontological over-productivity (i.e. 
‘critique-as-production’), which, in turn, serves to alleviate intellection of all 
assertoric responsibility, by implying that nature, in her largesse and largeness, 
licenses all. For, from Schelling’s “groundless ground” to Nietzsche’s “eternal 
return” to Deleuze’s update of the same, all assertions—no matter how 
arrogated and unjust—may well ultimately become apt by way of the mindless 
maximalism of overflowing becomings. Accordingly, we do not make just 
judgements, only sublime ones.  
§ 
Plenitude, that is, is the doctrine of “those who pullulate under the blessings 
of that which appears to be total and perfect” (I&S 504), even if the ‘totality’ 
and ‘perfection’ in question is attributive of injudicious profusion rather than 
prudent justice. 
§ 
Pollent plenitude flows, down from its nineteenth-century origins, directly 
into the discourses on AI unfolding in our current moment. It is behind all 
those accounts that reduce the riddle of intelligence to a mere question of 
“force” (I&S 453). The basic conceit, again and again, is that more is always the 
answer.46 Or, that extensional proliferations will somehow alleviate 
intellogenesis of the impositions of intensionally-involved judiciary (whether in 
the auto-catalytic definition of intelligence as blind self-ampliation or in the 
confidence in ‘diagonal arguments’ where one simply produces more 
argumentative options in avoidance of having to choose).47 It is exactly this 
 
45 G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, & H.R. Lane, London, Continuum, 
2004, pp.353. 
46 Note, by the by, that ‘acceleration’ is almost synonymous with ‘more’. 
47 N. Land, ‘Crypto-Current (008)’, §0.211, <http://www.ufblog.net/2018/ 11/08/>, 2018 (retrieved 
29/03/2019). 
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attitude, as Negarestani perspicaciously diagnoses, that “sanctions the demotion 
of general intelligence as qualitatively distinct to a mere quantitative account of 
intelligent behaviours prevalent in nature” and, by thus reducing a question of 
‘vocation’ to a question of ‘enumeration’, engenders a stance that leads just as 
much to hobbyhorsical “talk of thinking forests” (I&S 111) as to visions about 
cities as incipient superintelligences. 
Such post-humanist approaches invariably presume only the naïve 
conception of possibility2. They crudely allude, that is, to the preponderance of 
indiscriminate possibilia over our discriminating practices, in order to disabuse 
us of practical constraints by demonstrating their “parochialism” (I&S 111-2) 
and, thereby, aim to leverage such unintelligent profligacy in order to deliver us 
from bothering with discernment in intellogenesis. Yet, once one realizes that 
talk of possibility2 (as ‘talk of indiscriminating capacity to be’) is, in practice, 
utterly parasitic upon talk of possibility1 (as ‘capability to open-endedly 
discriminate consistency from inconsistency’), one accordingly also realizes that 
whilst it is, as a simple epistemological matter, true that there are likely far 
more potential intelligences than the contingently actual human one, it is also 
true, as a much deeper semantic issue, that all possible talk, inasmuch as it is 
intelligible, presupposes the semantogenic ability to grasp basic notions of what 
is right and what is wrong, and this, in turn, puts salient boundary conditions 
upon any such “Posthuman Possibility Space” (to use David Roden’s useful 
phraseology).48 
Nick Land, noticing that the twentieth-century’s “electronic mechanization 
of the algorithm” erases any residual distinction between numbers as theoretic-
representations and as practical-actions, consequently announces that there can be 
no “defensible theoretico-practical difference in the epoch of electronics”. This, 
he believes, makes a “nonsense of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’”: a sentiment he 
captures in the slogan “Programs are data”, by which he means that all purposive 
functions are now decomposable into sets of data-points. All we need, then, is 
more data, more power, more iterative games. All we need is more. Or, 
 
48 Negarestani’s auspicious shift from “Hard Parochialism” to “Soft Parochialism” (I&S 111-2) resembles 
the shift from Cartesian problematics to Kantian problematics within the philosophy of mind. J. Conant, 
‘Two Varieties of Skepticism’, in Wittgenstein and Skepticism, ed. D. McManus, London, Routledge, 2004, 
pp.97-102. 
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alternately, the “will-to-think”—as indiscriminate auto-proliferation—“is the 
entirety of what a seed-AI has to be”.49 
Nonetheless, as there is no adult without the trials and tribulations of the 
child, our seed-AI requires more than plenitude’s absolutions in order to earn 
the status of having a mind, of having a world in view, and of thereby having so 
much as even a potential position in any game (I&S 357-76).50 
As Humeanism was to ‘sense data’, so post-humanism frequently is to ‘big 
data’ (I&S 511-2): a radical extensionalism that is blind to the truth that all 
extensional reference requires intensional involvements. Put differently, our 
“seed-AI” may have capacities to compress and predict arbitrarily large data-
sets (superseding our own capacity for the same by daunting margins), but 
“prediction isn’t explanation” and “general intelligence” demands the further 
“ability to selectively compress data” (I&S 312-5, my emphasis). This 
recapitulates the Kantian insight that, pace Hume, one cannot grant oneself 
mindedness by conscripting a copiousness of inductions. Plenitude is not the 
path to intelligence. As it ultimately proved inadequate for the job of Theodicy, 
it will ultimately prove inadequate for the project of “the crafting of a new 
species of intelligence” (I&S 465). 
§ 
Invoking pollent plenitude, the Tenebrous philosopher confidently claims 
that every thought, no matter how arrogated, is perfectly a manifestation of 
nature in the latter’s irresponsible maximality, or, thinking is most ‘true’ when 
it is not discriminating between better and worse but is instead indiscriminately 
affirming its myriad realisations. Yet this conceit, from post-structuralism into 
post-humanism, operates only to strip judgement of all meaningful stakes and, 
thus, is a form of radical circumspection or risk aversion. It works, that is, to 
 
49 N. Land, ‘Crypto-Current (018)’, <https://www.ufblog.net/2018/12/01/>, 2018 (retrieved 
29/03/2019). 
50 To mistake extant expert systems and narrow AIs, and their game-playing aptitude, as being inductively 
indicative of some preponderance of possible intellects as outstripping intelligences-bound-by-constraints 
is to mistake, as Kant would put it, an “als ob” judgement for a constitutive one (cf. I&S 402). The 
purposiveness of such apperception-forlorn systems is, in the last analysis, derivative and dependent 
apropos the distributed framework of assessments-of-purpose that we humans, as currently the only norm-
mongering intellects, are an integral, and non-optional, component of. 
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repatriate thought in an extrajudicial and unruly nature: and it does so not by 
unveiling locally extrajudicial and unruly aspects within our practices (which is 
part and parcel of the calling of critique) but, instead, by greedily and 
plenistically proclaiming the global submersion of rules within unruly 
pulsions.51 (This ‘repatriation’ is often conceptualized along the lines of 
inheritance and filiation or with narratives of ‘circuitous return’: whether 
expressed via ‘the genetic’, ‘the larval’, or ‘the thanatropic’.) Ultimately, such 
submersion represents an attempt to dissolve what Negarestani identifies as the 
incessantly disequilibrating tension essential to rationality: where ‘rationality’ is 
defined as the dawning mind’s sensitization to the “inexhaustible” differential 
between how judgments and actions should be and how they actually are.52 
Rejecting this differential—and the accountability that is unavoidably elicited 
by minimal awareness of it—demarcates an attempt to ‘equilibrate’, or, return 
to child-like equipoise.  
This, then, is the core symptom, and failing, of Geistschmerz. In its core 
equilibration (of semantic possibility and temporal possibility) it is just as 
circumspect as Theodicy’s cradling of human reason within an interminably 
reasonable cosmos. For, by collapsing modality and temporality so as to forego 
the tools by which we methodologically distinguish regulative values from 
descriptive facts, plenitude, regardless of whether it is prudent or pollent, 
equally results in the mingling of human axiology and independent reality 
insofar as, across both instances, it operates as the attempted cancellation, not 
only of the disequilibrium triggered by the inexhaustible irreducibility of evaluative 
axioms over declarative realities (or, of possibility1 over possibility2), but also 
thereby of the consequent tenaciousness that such a differential demands of us in 
our practical and theoretical activities (I&S 266). Simply, genuflecting mind in 
front of a nature “prodigal beyond measure” achieves precisely the same 
pragmatic result as redoubting mind within a nature that is prudent without 
exception.53 
 
51 R. Brandom, ‘Reason, Genealogy, and the Hermeneutics of Magnanimity’, <http://www.pitt. 
edu/~brandom/downloads/RGHM%20%20i2-n-2i%20a.docx>, 2014 (retrieved 29/03/2019). 
52 Negarestani details this disequilibrium as a “tension that continually decoheres and recoheres the child’s 
world toward what is ultimately an objective critical position” (I&S 267). 
53 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London, Penguin, 1990, pp.39. 
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Tenebrosity, therefore, can be defined as any attempt at ‘effectuating a 
repatriating equilibration via the maximalization of disvalue’. We see 
exemplary instances in Schopenhauer’s thesis that we live in the “worst of all 
possible worlds” (for there is no enormity reality will not actualize) and even in 
Land’s claim that torment is interminable (because “[a]cross the aeons our 
mass of hydro-carbon enjoys a veritable harem of souls”).54 And so, despite 
reifying disvalue instead of value (in defining nature, maximally, as perversion 
rather than prudence), post-Enlightenment Tenebrosity still provides a cradle 
(or self-induced nonage) even if it now consists in the narcotic absolutions of 
irresponsibility and impiety, rather than the insulations of theodical assurance.  
Accordingly, the Tenebrous philosopher, to pick up on Kant’s imagery, 
wants to run his “ship ashore, for safety’s sake”.55 And this is because he cannot 
accept the tenaciousness of eternal course-correction upon ‘hazardous seas’: or 
the duties demanded of us by our unique position as sophonts seemingly alone 
within an otherwise silent universe; ‘silent’ in that it is utterly non-responsive to 
the axiological intuitions of lonely sophonts like ourselves, utterly regardless of 
whether such intuitions foreground irresponsible creativity over prudent order.  
In the 21st-century, on the verge of whatever “comes next” (I&S 95), we 
cannot afford such retrograde absolutions, for these deliverances only provide 
‘security’ in the sense that choosing to ignore oncoming dangers provides 
‘security’. Instead, we need a Tenacity that is attuned to, and comfortable with, 
ineliminable risk. 
And so, taking up the maritime metaphor favoured by Kant, Negarestani 
claims that reason must be “the navigator of deep waters” (I&S 446). This is 
because rationality, as that which “perilously realizes its craft” (I&S 476), is 
“periculum”: an ancient nautical term simultaneously denoting ‘turbulent 
hazard’, ‘high-returns venture’, and ‘obligating contract’. Negarestani, that is, 
rightly stresses the pragmatic indivisibility of risk-taking and reasoning. 
“Intelligence is an essentially risk-laden commitment” (I&S 488). For 
responsibility and risk are but two sides of the same coin: it is through exposing 
our judgements to jeopardization, and thereby displaying receptivity to their 
 
54 A. Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J. Payne, vol.1, 3.vols, New York, Dover, 
1969, pp.584-5 & N. Land, The Thirst for Annihilation, London, Routledge, 1992, pp.128. 
55 I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. J.W. Ellington, Indianapolis, Hackett, 2001, pp.6. 
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corrigibility via defeasance, that we practically undertake ever-increasing 
responsibility for our judgements, and we do so precisely through evidencing 
our propensity to update our assertions in the face of contravening precarity, 
such that riskiness is the very medium for the making and staking of claims 
because it is only through submitting them to such unending frangibility that 
we reach ever better claims. Risk is the veritable avenue of our self-improvement; 
yet without responsibility, and thus stakes, riskiness is nothing at all. Risk is 
essentially apperceptive; and apperception is indissociably risky; for, to think is to risk. This 
notion is the very heart of Tenacity. It is why Negarestani urges us, standing on 
the cusp of whatever “comes next”, to take the “path of freedom and risk its 
fragility and your livelihood in descending into the abyss of the intelligible” 
rather than pursuing “the downhill path of an easy fall back to the homely 
earth where nothing is ever risked (despite bravado to the contrary)” (I&S 36). 
Indeed, the Tenebrous philosopher may noisily welcome human extinction as 
the ‘ultimate risk’, but they cannot be understood to have ever properly risked 
anything, inasmuch as they deny norms and, thus, also the stakes that provide 
the occasion for forecast in the first place. Thus, in stark contradistinction to 
the trivializations of the Framework of Plenitude, we note that Geist is that 
which thrives upon daring and attenuates in circumspection. One must take the 
open “path” of “risky adventures”—and accept all the attendant “fragility”—
rather than resort to the “comforting home” of claustrophobic plenty (I&S 36). 
“[W]e will never settle”, Negarestani writes, and “we will never mistake 
anything for our home” (I&S 247); for Tenacity defines undying diligence to 
the duty of self-correction as “the very vector of alienation” (I&S 247). 
§ 
The liberations promised by rejection of discursive responsibility, from 
those of indeterminate negation (Land’s ‘unilateral death’), to unexplainable 
difference (the becoming in which nothing is identical with itself), to the 
Meillassouxian advent or Foucaldian episteme (as the contingence with no ratio 
essendi), all instance the attempt to shirk rigorous explanation via a form of 
semantic decadence. Ultimately, all these philosophemes of the post-humanist 
and anti-humanist toolbox are ‘liberatory’ only inasmuch as they refuse the 
enabling constraints proper to probing and constructive inquiry. 
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§ 
And yet, as one does not see better by poking out one’s eyes, one does not 
approximate truth by metagrobolizing. One cannot ‘roll towards X’ through 
feeling alone (no matter how doomy or gothic that feeling may be).56 You can’t 
reach the Outside (and it is always capitalized) by trepanning yourself. 
Accordingly, Tenebrosity’s characteristic rejection of enabling constraints 
proffers only the art of lobotomizing oneself with philosophical skotison. 
§ 
“Dispending with such constraints can only effectuate a conception of 
intelligence that is a reservoir of human subjective biases and personal flights of 
fancy”, Negarestani concurs (I&S 116). For the Tenebrous philosopher as much 
as for the Theodical, “our objective view of ourselves in the world [inevitably] 
becomes yet another manifest self-portrait”. Which is why, concerning 
discussions on AGI in particular, our vaticinations on superintelligence 
become, “like the picture of Dorian Gray”, nothing but an “ever more 
distorted picture of ourselves” (I&S 174). 
One does not reach Copernicanizing insights by decerebrating oneself in 
the pursuit of profligacy but only by earning them through constancy to “the toil 
of examination” and the “labour of working out” (I&S 422). Consequently, 
Negarestani champions the undertaking of enabling constraints and does so by 
leveraging his core definition of “interaction” and “computation” as 
proceeding via “games of refutations” (I&S 297), wherein one agent holds 
others accountable and is held to account in turn, for all such games turn 
around the axis of a central “architectonics of negation” which, by way of 
detailing the procedure of deselecting unsound commitments, cements the core 
dictum that intellogenesis, qua the ongoing empowerment of mind, must needs 
consist in austere shepherding rather than bountiful blindness. 
Concept creation merely “for the sake of multiplicity and diversification is a 
craftsman’s caprice”, Negarestani avers. Teeming alternatives alone are not 
“by any means reflective of reality”, for all “alternatives are beholden to the 
 
56 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale, New York, Random House, 
1968, pp.8. 
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criteria of rightness [and] the procedures by which false alternatives can be 
distinguished from those which are right, fit and testable”. (Possibility1, in other 
words, precedes possibility2.) Negarestani says this in order to pre-emptively 
fortify his project of “worldmaking” against its inevitable expropriation by the 
proponents of indiscriminating plenitude and the alchemists of concept 
creation. “Ways of worldmaking”, he clarifies, “are inherently ways of  knowing, 
and are therefore intrinsically sensitive to the principles required for knowing 
and explaining things”. There is, therefore, “no mandate to imagine or make 
new worlds” simply for the sake of formicating proliferation (I&S 425). He 
quotes Goodman: 
[A] willingness to welcome all worlds builds none. Mere acknowledgement of the 
many available frames of reference provides us with no map of the motions of the 
heavenly bodies; acceptance of the eligibility of alternative bases produces no 
scientific theory or philosophical system; awareness of the varied ways of seeing a 
painting makes no picture. A broad mind is no substitute for hard work.57 
I&S can be seen, ultimately, as a defence of the Enlightenment notion of 
enabling constraint and positive freedom. This is expressed, throughout, in frequent 
references to education as “social scaffolding” (I&S 280) and in allusions to 
language as the “generative platform upon which mind takes shape” (I&S 67). 
For, starting from the “stabilization of acoustic data” created by the first 
consolidation of linguistic rules (I&S 319), Negarestani’s Bildung tracks the 
“canalization” of behaviours by those “generative constraints” (I&S 297) 
constitutive of language as the veritable “scaffolding for the organization” of 
intelligence (I&S 67), or, alternately, as that “dimension of structuration” (I&S 
276) which undergirds the massively distributed repository of practical 
“methods and models” (I&S 501)—or “recipes” (I&S 456)—within which alone 
mind can have a world in view, and hold itself accountable to that world, by 
way of the congenital realisation of said world’s radical non-responsivity to any 
and all unstructured (i.e. merely prolific) account. The ‘price of entry’ for this is 
partaking in the interactive game of constraining and being constrained 
because “cognition is always a recognition” (I&S 421) and recognitive 
interaction consists in mutual limitation, rigorizing, and sorting (I&S 353). 
Here, Negarestani cleverly employs the notion of an “open harness” taken from 
 
57 N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1978, pp.21. 
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the interactivist approach to computation: denoting that which ‘harnesses’ in 
the sense of constraining an agent’s legal moves, but also conjointly ‘harnesses’ 
in the sense of bolstering towards the better (I&S 70).58  
Accordingly, as Chomsky once decreed: 
The many modern critics who sense an inconsistency in the belief that free 
creation takes place within—presupposes, in fact—a system of constraints and 
governing principles are quite mistaken; [for without] this tension between 
necessity and freedom, rule and choice, there can be no creativity, no 
communication, no meaningful acts at all. 
General intelligence just is “free creation within a system of rule”.59 Our 
protagonist Kanzi, that is, achieves recognitive maturity by rejecting possibility2 
as merely “the endless orgies of nature” (I&S 277) and by instead proving to his 
guardians and peers his aptitude in following possibility1 as, contrarily, the 
possibility to be just. To champion this necessarily judicial component of intellect 
is to show that mind is possible “not in spite of material causes and social 
activities but by virtue of specific kinds of causes” (I&S 451). And in this insight 
is, simultaneously, the apprehension that the perennial imperfection of the temporal 
realisation of our most cherished imperatives is no invitation for their global 
genealogical delegitimization (I&S 75-6) but is, rather, the tell-tale trace of their 
“time-generality” qua non-descriptive and topic-neutral operativity. 
§ 
Indeed, the post-Leibnizian retention of plenitude—under its new guise as 
epistemological exoneration—explains the allergy to time-general thoughts 
symptomatic of late modernity’s “time-cult”. For, as we have seen, the holus-
bolus reduction of modality to temporality, or possibility1 to possibility2, demotes 
all meaningfulness to maximalization. Ultimately, “time-general thoughts” lie 
in the necessary distinction between modality and time.  
Time, that is, is an entirely factual affair (of some x at time t) but, as we have 
 
58 Harnesses ‘both serve to constrain system behavior (like the harness of a horse) and to harness behavior 
for useful purposes’. P. Wegner, ‘Why Interaction is More Powerful than Algorithms’, in Communications of 
the ACM, vol.40, no.5, 1997, pp.86. 
59 N. Chomsky, For Reasons of State, New York, Pantheon Books, 1970, pp.403. This Chomskian apothegm 
captures the generality of general intelligence—its domain-agnostic aptitude—much better than any 
definition of intelligence as “competence at winning games”. 
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seen, not all language can be purely in the business of fact-stating, and to 
presume that it can be is to miss the role of rules which must be employed to 
assay declarations but can never themselves be declaratively exhausted. 
Accordingly, the very imperfection of our realization of reason’s demands 
doesn’t reveal infidelity in the rule in question (disrobing it as mere theistic 
baggage to be overridden with natural abundance) but shows that we are acting 
in accordance with a maxim whose motivating force, qua “formal”, cannot be 
reduced to the matter-of-factual frequency of  its obeyances or transgressions, failures and 
victories, at certain times. Such dicta have contentfulness—and thus motivating 
force for action and guidance for decision—above and beyond all such 
enumeration. Accordingly, “intelligence reasons and acts from time-general and 
inexhaustible ends, rather than towards them” (I&S 469). This is precisely what 
Fichte meant when he said his task “must be eternal”. He was not saying that 
his vocation actually will be eternal, but that its motivations and demands cannot 
be exhausted by specification of temporal etiologies, spatial vicinities, 
physiological germlines, or any other such “manifest totality” (I&S 8), no 
matter how copious or coreferential. And this, ultimately, is why ‘what is rational’ 
is substrate-agnostic, or, is an endowment and vocation irreducible to the lives, 
and even the species, that presently uphold it. 
It is simply as an unavoidable artefact of the semantic purism of the 
transcendental (i.e. that there must be non-declarative language for declaration 
to function, or, ‘all overt description involves covert prescription’) that intellect 
cannot but orient itself towards such ends as are topic- and time-neutral 
(inasmuch as all of its core operations presuppose such orienteering). To be a 
sophont, and to be worthy of the name, is to delaminate oneself from the 
tyrannies and the immurements of claustrophobic plenitudes. This is the 
Aufforderung, or summons, that Fichte identified with reasoning. Intelligence’s 
“actions are not merely responses to particular circumstances, or time-specific 
means for pursuing ends that are exhausted once fulfilled” (I&S 466); and so, 
this is why even the most quotidian activities of our everyday judging cannot but 
be swept up in an “atemporal and atopic” vocation (I&S 468), or, a project 
from “nowhere and nowhen” (I&S 21). For, as there is no extension without 
intension, intelligence isn’t the possibility-to-be-more without the possibility-to-be-more-
right. And this, by the by, is why orthogonalist angst about potential 
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superintelligences that are quantitative giants, yet axiological dwarfs, are likely 
overwrought: because “any artificial agency that boasts at the very least the full 
range of human cognitive-conceptual abilities can have neither indelible norms 
nor fixed goals—even if it was originally wired to be a paperclip maximizer” (I&S 
397). Such soothsaying ‘maximizer’ narratives, whether dramatized by 
Bostrom’s paperclip orthogonalism or by Land’s exothermic diagonalism, are 
alike symptoms of plenitudinarianism, or the “flight from intension” that Quine 
long ago declared, precisely in their shared refusal that certain concepts can be 
indispensable and legitimating regardless of the maximalism or minimalism of 
their frequential and factual realization.60  
§ 
Objectivity implies adjudication; adjudication implies measurement against 
the good; and, simply, the good entails the better (I&S 399). This demarcates 
the disequilibration constitutive of sapience, or what Negarestani calls its 
“transcendental excess” (I&S 483-4), and it is what all philosophical plenitudes 
attempt to suffocate and smother. Plenitude is work-shy. For this unstable 
disequilibration entails that intelligence cannot but be interested not merely with 
surviving but also with thriving, and thriving requires self-incurred selection 
rather than self-absolving profusion. 
§ 
It is not in bountiful blindness but only “in limiting or constraining [itself] by 
the objective” that general intelligence earns its title (I&S 399). Intelligence’s 
work of parenting itself, of “applying itself to itself” (I&S 51), is therefore 
revealed as, essentially, the undertaking of generative constraints. By corollary, 
intelligence makes its possibility intelligible, and thus expedites its long-coming 
artificialization, “not by immunizing itself against systematic analysis, but by 
bringing itself under a thoroughgoing process of desanctification” (I&S 456). 
Such “desanctification”, as the cohort of enlightening, demands, now as it was 
two centuries ago, that we expunge and outgrow all the residual sanctities, 
cybergothic as much as theocratic, retained by those who still cling to the night-
side of mind. We must exorcise Mr Mystic, and his “LUMINOUS OBSCURE”, 
 
60 W.O. Quine, Word and Object, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1960, pp.191. 
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once and for all: even when such “darkness visible” is dressed up, in the most 
futuristic garb, as the “abstract threat” of some “Great Filter” purposed 
precisely with absolving us of all tenacious thought in advance.61  
Indeed, in the end, there is nothing so risibly human as pessimism about 
post-humanity, nothing so unimaginative as Lovecraftian horror apropos its 
unimaginability. To employ plenitude, darkly or vibrantly, to attempt to 
absolve intentionality of accountability is to reduce us from the decision-making 
creature (uniquely in charge of its fate, and summoned to self-betterment, 
because it acknowledges the precarities thereof) and to return us to the 
circumspect immurements either of claustrophobic sense or of over-abundant 
nonsense. A broad mind, after all, is no substitute for hard work. “Genuine 
speculation about posthuman intelligence”, Negarestani instead holds, can only 
begin with the “extensive labour” of choosing what we think is justified and, 
concordantly, undertaking all the self-incurred accountability involved in such a 
choice (I&S 117).  
This, then, is Intelligence and Spirit’s rejoinder to the Framework of Plenitude 
and it undergirds its petition for austere Tenacity—in opposition to formicating 
Tenebrosity—during this “prehistory of intelligence”. For, “[w]hatever [the] 
future intelligence might be, it will be bound to certain constraints necessary for 
rendering the world intelligible and acting on what it is intelligible” (I&S 403). 
That is, as there is no adult without the trials of the child, there is no general 
intelligence without the precedential history of its realisation, and, therefore, if 
there are to be any post-human general intellects, they will, whatever their 
constitution, be bound to remember and recollect us as their veritable past—no 
matter how imperfectly and impiously we currently live up to this calling. For 
our imperfection is no inditement against the legitimacy of the task: besides, 
there is no adult without the tribulations of the child. Accordingly, this is what 
Negarestani means when he says that “to be human is the only way out of 
being human” (I&S 60): where “human” here means infantile, inasmuch as we, 
as animals gripped by reason, cannot but consider ourselves as merely the 
“prehistory” to rationality, because to be rational is to strive, eternally and 
inexhaustibly, for the better. And so, just as, in the words of Roy Wood Sellars, 
 
61 N. Land, ‘On the Exterminator’, in Phyl-Undhu, Shanghai, Time Spiral Press, 2014. 
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“only [the] realism that passes through idealism can hold its ground”, so too is 
it true that “to be human is the only way out of being human”. These two 
statements mean the same thing. They both intone that the Child is the Parent 
of the Geist. And even if the great silence of the cosmic skies—the “Silentium 
Universi”—is of portentous and even impending significance for us, we cannot but 
attempt to parent something that will have made us worthy of remembrance.62 
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